Abstract. This paper summarizes our
Introduction
The effort of the research described in this paper was to implement a working multilevel-secure database prototype. Multilevcl Secure (MLS) models arc based on the classification of the system clements. whcre classifications are expressed by security Icvcls. Data objects have security levels and users have clearance Icvels. As an example, we can have three possible security levels S-Secret, C-Classified, and U- Unclassified, where S is a higher classification than C and U, and C is a higher classification than U. A security (or clearance) lcvcl 11 dominates another level 12 (stated as 11 2 12), if 11 is higher than or on the same level as 12 in the partial (or total) order of security levels. For example, S 2 C 2 U. According to the BcllLaPadula [ I ] simple property, a subject (uscr) can read a certain object (data) only if the subject's clearance level dominates the object's security level. In other words, a subject cannot read an objcct at a higher or incomparable sccurity level than the subject. Many MLS relational database models have been proposed. Early work in MLS relational databases was focused on the semantics and the relational algebra for MLS models. The SeaView model [2] was the first formal MLS secure relational database designed to provide mandatory security protection. Thc Sca View model cxtcnded the concept of a database relation to include the security labels. A relation that is cxtcnded with security classifications is called a multilcvcl relation. The Jajodia-Sandhu model [4] [7] was the first model to extensively address the semantics of an MLS database. In was shown that all of the aforcmcntioncd models can present users with some information that is difficult to interpret [ 5 ] . Consequently, the BCMLS model (thoroughly described in [6] ) addressed those concerns by including the scinantics for an unambiguous interpretation of all data presented to the users.
Due to its comprehensive semantics, we have choscn the BCMLS model as a basis for our prototype'. If a false tuple doesn't correspond to any rcal world entity in thc bclicf of higher level user, such tuple rcprcscnts a mirage tuple for the higher lcvcl user.
Implementation: Basics
The entity identitier for the relation shown in Tablc I is: Vcsscl + Vessel Class. That means that. for instance "Enterprise C" and "Entcrprise U" arc two different ships. The Table 1 prcscnts the cntrre relation, which IS at the same time the S-level user view. Table 2 shows the C-level uscr view and Table 3 shows the U-level uscr view. The U-level uscr view shows no classification labels bccausc Ulcvel users should not cven know that they arc working with a multilcvcl database, I For iiiorc background inforination about various MLS approaches and the associated database models we refer you
Implementation: Views
One of the main tasks that the system based on the BCMLS model must support is to prescnt to the users on different security levels only parts of security labcls that those users have right to see. Let us take an example of security label: Ucs U-level user can see: U (in fact U-level user in our implementation does not sec any security label -in his world there is no multilevel database) C-level uscr can see: U-C S-lcvcl user can sec: U-CS Obviously, we nced a function that will return a part of security label according to the user level. In our prototypc, we used a numerical system with basc 3. For cxamplc, C level is accounted for in a label as follows:
absence of C in the label = 0 (irrelevant)
One sccurity label consists of U-level data, Clevel data and S-lcvcl data. For example, UCS security label would be represciitcd as 222.
Combining with a numerical system with base 3 we have:
Soinc other exutiiples:
The complete sccurity label is represented with onc integer. Simple mathematical operation can break that integer nutnbcr into individual parts of the multi-level sccurity label. This is done using simple division and modulo function. The following code determines the composition of thc label.
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The result of this query is used in the following procedure that returns the visible part of the security label for uscr who executes that procedure procedure xview (label) { break label into parts; get user security ievel;
while (i<=user-level) { pack new label with parts that user can see; it+;
In thc BCMLS data model three important functions are defined:
1. pl (L): returns the primary level of security labcl L E.vaniples :
procedure pl(L) { break levels into parts; return the first part that has a value 2;
2. sl (L) : extracts and returns secondary levels of security label L sl function only indicates if bclicf on some level cxists, it docsn't rcveal if it's a true or false. 111 the second example above it docsn't mattcr if L=C-S or L=CS. The rcsult would bc thc same.
E.\-uniples:
procedure s i ( L ) { break levels into parts; exclude primary level; return the rest; 1 3. ib (c, L) : extracts and returns the belief of a user from the security level c about information labeled by the label L.
Our procedure takes only one argument: security labcl. User level is extracted from the system table 'Users' inside the procedure. Examples :
break levels into parts; get user security level; i=l.
J re turn ret-value ;
I
In our implementation we were driven by the idea to build as much as possible by using DBMS mechanisms. through stored procedures and triggers. Consequently, the client software should only take parts that caiiiiot be implemented with the DBMS facilities.
Aftcr implementing the basic functions as shown above, the next task was to build appropriate views of MLS database relation. Considering the fact that U-level user must not be aware of MLS database at all, we had to build two views: one for U-level user and other for highcr level users who should see part of security labels on their own and on levels below.
For completc understanding we present dbschema of example Tables 5. 6 , and 7. Tablc 5 represents S-level view, Table 6 represents C-level view, while Table 7 represents U-level view.
Implementation: Insert
The insert is implemented through storcd procedure. The procedure takes attributes as arguments, calculate value of security label and insert a coinplete tuple into the table.
For instance, assume that C-level user wants to insert the following data:
INSERT INTO starship VALUES ( " En t e r p r i s e " , "Trading") ;
This query would suit a regular relational database. However, in our MLS database this opeartion calls the following procedure:
EXEC UTE PROCE DU RE s i n se r t ( " En t e r p r i se " , " Ro umu 1 u s " , " Trading " ) ;
The procedure calculates value for security labels (for C-level user it would be: 0 + 2*3 + 0*9 = 6) and execute following query:
INSERT lNTO starship VALUES ("Enterprise", 6, "Roumulus", 6, "Trading", 6, 6, 0);
Implementation: Verify
Verification can be explicit (by using a command) or implicit (consequence of some other action such as delete procedure 
Implementation; Delete
During the implementation of DELETE we use the attribute 'flag' to indicate to higher level users who have belief about current tuple if the tuple is changed or delcted by the primary (lower) level user.
If the U-level user executes the following command on the table depicted by the views shown in Tables 5, 6 , and 7:
the tuple must not be deleted because the C and S-level users have set their belief onto that tuple. lnstcad of deleting, thc verify procedure will be executed. The tuple will be unverified on Ulevel. The flag will be set for C and S-level users that indicate that the original tuple is deleted and that they have to explicitly decide what to do with that tuple. The S-level view of the relation is rcprescntcd in Table 8 .
The value CS in the flag attribute for the middle tuple indicates, to both C and S level users (the flag would be scen as C only 011 C-level) that they can either delete this tuple (in effect accept the delete from the U-level) or reverify this tuplc as true. The U-level view of the database aftcr the 'delete' is shown into table 9.
The logic behind the flag value (which is also an integer) is similar to the logic developed for the tiiplc classification. If lb (flag) =1, then the flag is set. That means that a user on that level must explicitly decide what to do with the belief on that tuple. because the tuple has changed or has bccn dclcted.
. The user can dclctc tuple only if pl(tc)=c whcrc c is user level that executed the delete procedure.
Otherwise, the delete will be rejected.
The delete procedure has some additional after-delete effects. After the delete, is done, the unverify procedure is executed for all tuples\with the same EID (K+KC) as the deleted tuple, having Ib(tc)=l (belief: false). Since these were cover stories and they must be unverified after the true story they represent is deleted.
Procedure delete-in- , the user will choose a tuple t,, from among all t, 's (including t), and a new tuplc t,, based on tu will be inserted on the c Icvel, while the attribute values of tu itself will not change. Our version of the described UPDATE procedure is developed using storcd procedures and triggers in combination with a PHP code. This code, in essence, represents a middleware. Its purpose is to provide convcnience for further programming. I t enables the call of functions for update with right arguments; and then it checks the conditions, prcpares the query and exccutes it. All sensitive code is kept in one library (DLL in windows world). The programmers of client applications can use these functions without knowing their structure. This has two major advantagcs. First, is easicr programming for the application code programmers. The second one is related to a security issue. These fhctiotis can reveal sensitive information about inner structure of MLS database and because of that, it is a good idca to cloak them. This is convenient for the dcvelopment of cltent-server applications, where sensitive code can be put into the a middleware layer, along with acccss lists which control the possibility of dclcting and verifying tuples for a specific user.
Conclusions and Future Work
The semantic completcncss of BCMLS makes it powerful enough to withstand any demand that can be put on MLS database system today.
Its implcmentation is relatively complicated but accomplishable, as we illustrated with our prototypc. Significant amount of work has to be done on server sidc and client side in ordcr for this model to work in real life. Aside from the pcrfoniiance loss due to thc additional control opcrations and verifications, the major issue is the additional changing thc database structurc.
More work has to bc done in order to make this modcl attractive for cointnercial purposes. Therc is some amount of automatic verification processing in the background and (as o w fiiture project) we will pcrforin an analysis on the possible performance loss due to thcse and other operations (such as converting integer labels into charactcr strings).
We will simulatc MLS databases with hundreds of tables. In such environment it will be interesting to estimate the price of join, update and delete and to see how much of CPU time has to be spent on maintenance of the consistency of the entire visiblc world.
The other issue that will have to be considered is possibility of changing the structure of such MLS databases after they have been put into production state. The implementation has to support the changes to thc database structure in production state, so the whole model does not have to be table-structure dependant.
There are two ways of accomplishing that:
1. To construct the tool that will allow modifications to thc MLS database as if it is the regular relational database. Such tool would translate uscr's modifications into the MLS world. The user is involved in specific MLS issues as little as possible. 2. To make all database design on regular relational database. After the construction or modifications are complete. the tool translates the model into the MLS world.
The first method is conceptually better because it is easicr to make changes to the production-state databases.
